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BUREAUCRACY AS VIOLENCE
Jonathan Weinberg*
The Utopia of Rules: On Technology, Stupidity, and the Se-
cret Joys of Bureaucracy. By David Graeber. Brooklyn and
London: Melville House. 2015. P. 227. Cloth, $26.95; paper, $16.95.
Introduction
David Graeber’s book The Utopia of Rules: On Technology, Stupidity, and
the Secret Joys of Bureaucracy1 addresses bureaucracy in modern society: how
“bureaucratic principles [have been] extended to every aspect of our exis-
tence” (p. 27), and how nearly all of us have come to spend most of our time
filling out forms. In the first chapter of the book, the author tells a story of
his attempts to file paperwork to gain power of attorney over the bank ac-
count of his elderly mother, who was in a nursing home following a series of
strokes. The experience was frustrating and seemingly never ending. It in-
volved repeated errors—some made by him, some made by the bureaucratic
functionaries with whom he was interacting—and every error sent the pro-
cess back to square one (pp. 45–48). Nor, he concluded, was this experience
isolated: we’ve set up the institutions of everyday life so that we all spend
much of our time traversing bureaucratic mazes (pp. 48–52).
A little later in the book, Graeber addresses a seemingly different matter:
the role of police in society (pp. 72–75, 80–81). Graeber suggests, though,
that the two matters are not so different: policing is public law. Police are
line personnel, engaging with the general public, who apply and enforce
legal or organizational rules (p. 73). In other words, they are “bureaucrats
with weapons.”2 And it would be hard to say that they have wielded those
weapons well. In these days of tragedy in Minneapolis and Baton Rouge, in
Cleveland and Ferguson, in New York and Chicago—when thirty-eight un-
armed black people were killed by police in 20153—we need to ask why
those we have armed with day-to-day, street-level power over us have been
wielding it so scarily, heartbreakingly, badly.
* Professor of Law, Wayne State University. As always, Jessica Litman’s incisive
comments hugely improved this manuscript.
1. David Graeber is a Professor of Anthropology, London School of Economics and
Political Science.
2. P. 73; cf. Christopher Slobogin, Policing as Administration, 165 U. Pa. L. Rev. 91, 91
(2016) (“Police agencies should be governed by the same administrative principles that govern
other agencies.”).
3. People Shot Dead by Police in 2015, Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost
.com/graphics/national/police-shootings/ [https://perma.cc/D38B-TVSQ].
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Part of Graeber’s argument in this book is that police shootings and
bank bureaucratic runarounds have the same roots. The fundamental struc-
ture of our society, he contends, ensures that the exertion of power over the
general public by police officers and bank functionaries alike is doomed to
be arbitrary and uninformed.4 The reason, in brief, is that members of both
groups exert power over the public that derives not from deliberation, mu-
tual understanding, and consent, but from simple legal coercion.5 This
means that they need not see things from others’ point of view (pp. 66–72).
And that means that their interactions with the public are likely to be obtuse
and ignorant.6 As Graeber puts it, social structures in which inequality is
backed by power—what he terms “structural violence”—have the luxury of
being stupid (p. 57).
The Utopia of Rules isn’t an obvious choice for a survey of law-related
books. For starters, the author isn’t a lawyer. Graeber, a leading figure in the
Occupy movement7 and the author of the influential Debt: The First 5,000
Years,8 is a professor of anthropology at the London School of Economics
and Political Science.9 He doesn’t reference legal literature, and he doesn’t
actually approve of law as a framework for social organization.
The book, though, has a good deal to say about public law and its ori-
gins, strengths, and limitations, and lawyers can learn by engaging with its
arguments. Even where the law-trained reader disagrees with Graeber’s book
(and there will be many such places),10 The Utopia of Rules is fun and fasci-
nating, the product of a fertile, sharp-witted, and broadly educated mind
spinning out a wide range of ideas. In this Review I will question a variety of
the author’s arguments, but his point about the stupidity of power, I argue,
is both well-founded and deep. We must address it if we are to face the
challenges before us.
4. See p. 57.
5. See, e.g., pp. 58–61.
6. See, e.g., pp. 65–66.
7. See, e.g., Drake Bennett, David Graeber, the Anti-Leader of Occupy Wall Street,
Bloomberg Businessweek (Oct. 26, 2011, 11:42 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/arti-
cles/2011-10-26/david-graeber-the-anti-leader-of-occupy-wall-street [https://perma.cc/DP5X-
SFRC].
8. David Graeber, Debt: The First 5,000 Years (updated and expanded ed., 2014).
9. See supra note 1. The author, though currently based in England, was born and
trained in the United States and lived here until his mid-40s. See Bennett, supra note 7. The
book, accordingly, reads as U.S.-centric.
10. Not all of Graeber’s ideas stand up to scrutiny; for an example of one that does not,
consider his assertion that an increasingly large number of U.S. college graduates in the 1950s
and 60s came to work for a global, U.S.-led administrative apparatus incorporating interna-
tional organizations and military and intelligence efforts, and that that helps explain the popu-
larity of Weber’s theory of bureaucracy among U.S. academics during that period (wait,
what?). Pp. 54–56. I’ll focus in this Review on the parts of Graeber’s book that, to my mind,
work best for the intrepid law-trained reader.
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I. Bureaucracy and Structural Violence
The book begins with Graeber’s claim that ours is the age of “total
bureaucratization” (p. 18). We are constantly filling out forms, struggling
with phone trees, jumping through arbitrary, time-consuming, pointless,
paperwork-related hoops. It is not merely that we are enmeshed in a web of
government regulation, nor that we are stuck in corporate voicemail hell;
rather, we find ourselves subject to a bureaucratic blob combining public
and private power (pp. 11–28).
The techniques of corporate middle management and government ad-
ministration grew up in parallel in this country, Graeber explains, so that for
more than a century the United States has been a “profoundly bureaucratic
society” (p. 13). Corporate rules and paperwork requirements are shaped by
government regulation and the surrounding legal environment, but those
rules are themselves the product of industry lobbying and campaign contri-
butions; the end result is “the gradual fusion of public and private power
into a single entity” (p. 17).
Moreover, Graeber stresses what he sees as the increasing role of the
financial sector in the culture of corporate America. “Increasingly, corporate
profits in America are not derived from commerce or industry at all, but
from finance—which means, ultimately, from other people’s debts” (p. 24).
Much of that is student debt, itself the product of a bureaucratic culture
requiring formal educational credentials for an ever-broadening range of
jobs (pp. 21–24). And because debt repayment is enforced by law, the legal
apparatus has become “the main mechanism for the extraction of corporate
profits” (p. 24).
Finally, the “bureaucratization of everyday life” is intimately bound up
with violence (p. 32). Professional police forces, Graeber notes, are a rela-
tively modern invention, a product of the nineteenth century; before then,
he tells us, there were “no impersonal bureaucratic [authorities] who were,
like the modern police, empowered to impose arbitrary resolutions backed
by the threat of force” (p. 32). And that violence, he continues, is crucial to
our modern lives. As society provides more elaborate infrastructure to sup-
port the market, it employs more bureaucrats and enacts rules subjecting a
broader range of social relations to more extensive regulation. That change
in the state’s role increases the extent to which we are all in our everyday
lives subject to the threat of violence—since, after all, “impersonal rules and
regulations . . . can only operate if they are backed up by the threat of force”
(p. 32).
This claim about violence turns out to be central to Graeber’s argument.
Government rules are enforced via the threat of force: while “in ordinary
life, police rarely come in swinging billy clubs to enforce building code regu-
lations, . . . if one simply pretends the state and its regulations don’t exist,
this will, eventually, happen” (p. 86). So are the rules of corporate bureau-
cracy, to the extent they mediate claims about such matters as consumer
debt or rights of exclusion from the corporation’s property. Any such claim
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is part of “a system of property rights regulated and guaranteed by govern-
ments in a system that ultimately rests on . . . the ability to call up people
dressed in uniforms, willing to threaten” physical violence—and that sort of
threat is exactly what will happen if one chooses to ignore, say, a university’s
right to demand duly stamped and validated ID as a condition of entering
its library stacks (p. 58).
Our government, thus, has to be understood as managing structures of
pervasive inequality ultimately created and maintained by the threat of phys-
ical violence (even if actual violence is rare). But that fact, Graeber contin-
ues, dooms bureaucracy as a form of intelligent social organization. The
behavior of actors empowered by this sort of structural violence is inevitably
“stupid,” and bureaucracies formed to manage those situations cannot help
but produce willful blindness and absurdity (p. 57).
Why should that be? In the everyday business of social life, Graeber
urges, we need to do the work of understanding other people’s perceptions
and motivations, of figuring out “who you think they are, who they think
you are, what they might want out of the situation” (p. 68). Human rela-
tions are “complicated, dense with history and meaning. Maintaining them
requires a constant and often subtle work of imagination, of endlessly trying
to see the world from others’ points of view” (p. 68). Graeber calls that work
“interpretive labor,” and describes it as part of the ordinary human condi-
tion (p. 68).
Bureaucrats backed by the threat of violence, on the other hand, can
simply issue dictates and threaten physical force against those who fail to
comply. In so doing, they need not empathize with or understand their
counterparts. Rather than immersing themselves in thick social relation-
ships, they can engage in much simpler relations, such as “cross this line and
I will shoot you” (p. 68).
For this reason, Graeber explains, “situations of structural violence inva-
riably produce extreme lopsided structures of imaginative identification” (p.
69). Ordinary people need to understand those with power over them, but
bureaucrats bolstered by the threat of force need not know much about the
people they regulate (pp. 66–72). “[T]hose relying on the fear of force are
not obliged to engage in a lot of interpretive labor, and thus, generally
speaking, they do not” (p. 67). The greater the inequality between regulators
and regulated, the easier it is for regulators not to bother trying to under-
stand their public or the effects of their rules (pp. 65–66).
That’s not the end of it. There’s a second crucial reason, Graeber contin-
ues, why bureaucracy in the modern state offers a way to bypass interpretive
labor. “Bureaucratic knowledge is all about schematization”—it means “ig-
noring all the subtleties of real social existence and reducing everything to
preconceived . . . formulae” (p. 75). Bureaucrats apply “very simple pre-
existing templates to complex and often ambiguous situations”; they close
their eyes to rich social reality, and confine their attention to a tiny, arbitrar-
ily selected subset of the relevant facts (p. 75). For Graeber, that schematiza-
tion follows in large part from the freedom granted by power to ignore
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context, and the resulting “blinkered perspectives typical of the powerful”
(p. 82).
Nor is this all the damage that bureaucracy does. Perhaps most funda-
mental for Graeber is the sense that bureaucracy represents “a kind of war
against the human imagination” (p. 82). We’ve encountered one sense in
which this might be true: those exercising power via bureaucracy don’t need
to exercise imagination to understand those to whom they dictate. But Grae-
ber has in mind a deeper meaning as well. Leftist thought, he argues, is
founded on the principle that the world is socially conceived: that human
beings “first envision things, and only then bring them into being” (p. 88).
The job of constructing the world, thus, begins with thinking of ways in
which it could be different—preferably not as “some sort of prefab utopian
vision” (p. 92), but as part of a practical grappling with the complex reality
of the world as it is, making use of the same sort of interpretive labor and
imaginative identification earlier described.
Government and corporate bureaucracy rule out that sort of imagina-
tive work by encouraging overseers to be oblivious to their surroundings
and social context; by relegating workers to mindless, mechanical jobs with-
out autonomy; and by trapping bureaucratic subjects in boxes and artifi-
cially defined categories, both assuming conformity to social models and
pushing those characterized to fit inside their boxes. Moreover, the “bureau-
cratic spirit” is fundamentally timid and conservative, well designed “to
squelch anything likely to have revolutionary implications of any kind.”11
And yet, Graeber continues, we nonetheless find bureaucracy appealing
on a deep level. Some of those reasons are straightforward: sometimes sche-
matized bureaucratic relationships are preferable to thick, situationally sen-
sitive ones, so that “you can . . . pull out your validated photo ID card
without having to explain to the librarian why you are so keen to read about
homoerotic themes in eighteenth century British verse” (p. 152). There are
advantages, at least sometimes, to avoiding “complex and exhausting . . .
interpretive labor” (p. 152). It is alienating to use an impersonal waiting list
or lottery to allocate a limited number of organs for transplant, but any less
impersonal method would be “immeasurably worse” (p. 152). Moreover,
bureaucratic organization can provide a platform for others’ creativity;
Graeber suggests as an example the poetry and manifestos made possible by
11. Pp. 137, 139. Graeber devotes a significant chunk of the book to asking why (in his
view) American technological progress has stalled since the Second World War. The argument
is a little muddled; one statement that corporate-research spending declined because of tax law
changes, p. 127, is followed, without sense of apparent contradiction, by a statement that such
spending has actually increased, p. 132. His central argument points to researchers’ increased
burden today dealing with paperwork and bureaucracy. Pp. 133–35. This suggestion is exem-
plary of the book’s limitations: it would be notable if backed up by serious history-of-science
research, but it is not. On initial encounter, Graeber’s thesis appears to be grounded in little
more than the author’s annoyance about the modern research university’s reliance on
paperwork and encouragement of self-promotion. See pp. 133–35. More fundamentally,
though, the argument resonates with Graeber’s position that our society’s creative urge has
been snuffed out with the rise of a bureaucratic mindset that is fundamentally antithetical to
creativity. See pp. 137–39.
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the establishment of the (highly bureaucratic) postal system in nineteenth-
century Germany (pp. 153–58).
But, Graeber continues, there are deeper reasons. He begins his explana-
tion by contrasting the medieval vision of a “celestial bureaucracy” of angels
with the sharply different imagined societies of heroic Homeric epics and
modern high fantasy (pp. 174–81). Heroic and fantasy worlds, he urges, are
fundamentally antibureaucratic (p. 175). Heroic societies value potlatch and
the ephemeral (p. 178); their leadership derives from charisma (p. 177). In
such a world, “[t]he whole point of life [is] to do things that other people
might wish to sing about” (p. 179). In fantasy worlds similarly, “every aspect
of bureaucratic existence has been carefully stripped away” in favor of char-
ismatic actors taking unpredictable steps in a novelistically gripping fight
against absolute evil (pp. 180–81). All of this stands in contrast to the value-
free, mechanical, predictable world of bureaucratic organization.
Fairy tales, though, illustrate the downside of (some) nonbureaucratic
societies: exciting as such a fantasy world might be, Graeber notes, few of us
would want to live in one (p. 186). He draws a parallel distinction between
play and games. Games are “pure rule-governed action,” and that’s why
they’re fun: they eliminate the ambiguity and interpretive burden of every-
day life (p. 191). Play, by contrast, is improvisational and open-ended—“a
pure expression of creative energy” for its own sake (pp. 191–92). Play,
though, is also “potentially terrifying” (p. 192), since it can be “randomly
destructive. Cats play with mice. Pulling the wings off flies is also a form of
play” (p. 192). A thinking person would do his best to avoid a playful god
(p. 193). And by the same token, we fear play by a governmental sovereign,
above and unconstrained by law (pp. 193–94).
The appeal of bureaucracy, Graeber concludes, lies in the fear of play.
We have come to embrace bureaucracy in order to embrace rules: because of
“a tacit cosmology in which the play principle (and by extension, creativity)
is itself seen as frightening, while game-like behavior is celebrated as trans-
parent and predictable, and where as a result, the advance of all these rules
and regulations is itself experienced as a kind of freedom” (p. 196).
At this point, though, the administrative-lawyer reader has reason to
take a step back. Has Graeber spun out a dazzling run of polymathic erudi-
tion—deploying an analysis of fantasy literature, Pythagorean philosophy,
Ficino’s taxonomy of angels, heroic societies in the ancient Middle East, and
Huizinga’s theory of games and play—only to conclude that the appeal of
rule-bound bureaucracy lies in the desire to constrain arbitrary and destruc-
tive sovereign power? Of course it does, a lawyer might answer. Of course the
point of a body of law binding administrative actors to follow rules and
procedural norms is to constrain arbitrary government power. Why is this
even a question?
U.S. courts have long stressed that “the law is the definition and limita-
tion of power,”12 and government is not allowed the exercise of unbounded,
12. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
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arbitrary power.13 “Arbitrary power . . . is not law, whether manifested as the
decree of a personal monarch or of an impersonal multitude.”14 That is why
the Administrative Procedure Act invalidates “arbitrary” or “capricious”
agency action.15 Administrative and corporate law in this country since the
Second World War have been driven by the desire to say, “Don’t worry,
bureaucratic organizations are under control.”16 And that is why administra-
tive law seeks to bind government actors by rule: as Justice Scalia put it, in
order to have the “rule of law,” we must have “a law of rules.”17
So why is that not straightforward? For Graeber, the answer is first that
“the pursuit of freedom from arbitrary power simply ends up producing
more arbitrary power” (p. 205). Attempts to use bureaucracy to avoid arbi-
trary government action will inevitably fail. Bureaucracy does not constrain
power; it may look rational or efficient from the top, but it is inevitably
arbitrary, obfuscating, and stupid from the perspective of the citizen-sub-
ject.18 Purportedly neutral rules, in any event, can be deployed unequally,
making them a vehicle for arbitrary personal power (p. 27).
Second, Graeber sees our hope of constraining the arbitrary exercise of
power as illusive, because our real problem is not arbitrariness—it’s power.19
Even if we could eliminate arbitrariness, the nature of power in our society,
one in which relationships of command are backed up by the ultimate threat
of violence, guarantees that its directives are stupid and soul-deadening (p.
57).
Finally, part of the question Graeber is trying to answer is why everyday
life in modern society is constrained, as he sees it, by so many rules: building
codes, auto licensing and insurance rules, open container laws, rules limiting
who can “buy or sell or smoke or build or eat or drink what where” (p. 61).
His answer is that those rules are part of the pervasive bureaucratization of
everyday life, and that we can understand our tolerance for them if we can
understand what makes rule-boundedness and bureaucracy appealing (p.
149). So the answer Graeber seeks is not merely why bureaucrats are con-
strained by rules, but why we all are: why we collude in tying ourselves
down, like Gulliver, by the cords of petty regulation. His answer is that we
have come to be so afraid of creativity—of its destructiveness, its instability,
13. See id. at 369–70; see also Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 380–81 (1901) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (“The glory of our American system of government is that it was created by a
written constitution which protects the people against the exercise of arbitrary, unlimited
power . . . .”).
14. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 536 (1884).
15. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012).
16. Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1276,
1284 (1984). Frug’s trenchant paper anticipated a number of the arguments discussed here. See
id.
17. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175 (1989).
18. See p. 41.
19. See pp. 201–05.
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its arbitrariness—that instead we embrace rules and bureaucracy as a
hoped-for zone of safety.20
II. On Rules
The connection Graeber draws between bureaucracy and rules says
something important, I think, about his understanding of the uses of power.
Here’s Graeber: “bureaucratic procedure invariably means ignoring all of the
subtleties of real social existence and reducing everything to . . . forms, rules,
statistics, or questionnaires” (p. 75). As a result, people who interact with
bureaucratic administration are left with the impression that “they are deal-
ing with people who have for some arbitrary reason decided to put on a set
of glasses that only allows them to see only 2 percent of what’s in front of
them” (p. 75). The author doesn’t call it that, but this is the familiar (to
lawyers, anyway) problem of rules and standards.21
A rule, in this lingo, is simple and hard-edged, and consequently easily
administrable; it causes results to turn mechanically on a limited number of
fairly easily ascertainable facts. There are a lot of those in the law. For exam-
ple, the provision that you can vote beginning on your eighteenth birthday is
a rule. It’s in the nature of rules, though, that they exclude from considera-
tion facts that would otherwise be relevant, facts that a sensitive deci-
sionmaker would otherwise consider.22 That means that sometimes they will
generate results contrary to the policies underlying them.23 The point of the
eighteen-year-old franchise, for example, is to screen out voters who are un-
wise and immature, while allowing those who are mature and capable; in
practice, though, some folks below eighteen may be mature and capable,
while some above it might not be.
For that reason, there can be advantages to making a legal consequence
turn not on application of a rule, but on an ad hoc evaluation of how a
general policy directive (in other words, a “standard”) applies to the overall
facts of a situation. That’s what juries do when they decide whether some-
body drove at a “reasonable” speed—given visibility, road conditions, and
so on. The problem, though, is that the situationally sensitive application of
a standard is expensive and unpredictable;24 moreover, standards can lend
20. See pp. 192–93.
21. Duncan Kennedy first popularized this language. See Duncan Kennedy, Form and
Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1685, 1685, 1687–89 (1976). By now
its use has expanded far beyond its original roots. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The
Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 22, 58–59 (1992). It is a staple of the law-
and-economics literature. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42
Duke L.J. 557 (1992); see also, e.g., David McGowan, Two Ironies of UPL Laws 5–6 (San Diego
Legal Studies, Paper No. 16-218, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2791116 [https://perma.cc/8WFN-EGS6].
22. Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 Yale L.J. 509, 510, 536–37 (1988).
23. Id. at 534–35.
24. Jonathan Weinberg, Broadcasting and Speech, 81 Calif. L. Rev. 1101, 1169 (1993);
see Kaplow, supra note 21, at 569.
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themselves to arbitrary and biased administration.25 Not many people would
welcome the creation of a government office charged with examining every
prospective voter, regardless of age, to determine that person’s fitness to
vote.26 There would be no screening out of relevant facts in such an exami-
nation—decisionmakers would be able to take into account everything they
learned about us—but the dangers of partiality and inconsistency would be
overwhelming.27
The end result is that American law is chock-full of rules, standards, and
decisionmaking criteria falling somewhere on the continuum stretching be-
tween them.28 Bureaucrats’ instructions sometimes incorporate standards
(witness the Communications Act’s direction to the FCC to grant a broad-
cast license when doing so is in the “public . . . interest”29). Much of the
time, they incorporate rules—directions to look to a narrow band of facts,
like chronological age, while ignoring the rest. The conventional under-
standing is that doing so is less expensive, generates more predictable results,
and offers protection against certain forms of arbitrariness and bias.30 Such
an approach, it is true, sometimes generates results that are illogical because
they ignore facts that are meaningful in a particular context—but hey, mod-
ern American law tells us, no decisionmaking process is perfect.31
Understanding Graeber’s criticism of rules in terms of the
rules–standards dichotomy raises two questions. The first is do bureaucrats
disproportionately rely on rules, as Graeber suggests?
Certainly it can seem from the perspective of the regulated that bureau-
crats are constantly relying on rules, citing rules, telling one to fill out forms
that do not give room to explain the complete facts of a situation, telling one
that without regard to the facts of one’s situation, the rule says that one has
to file a Form 11-M612-G before one’s claim can be heard at all. Bureaucrats
can cite rules as excuses for why they will not help you. Michel Crozier once
wrote that people build bureaucracies because “they are trying to evade face-
to-face relationships and situations of personal dependency whose authori-
tarian tone they cannot bear.”32 Thus, the excuse of rules can be part of an
attempt to salvage human relationships within a structure built on
hierarchy.
25. See Weinberg, supra note 24, at 1169.
26. Id.
27. See id. at 1169–70.
28. Sullivan, supra note 21, at 61.
29. 47 U.S.C. § 307(a) (2012).
30. See, e.g., Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 315–16 (1992) (explaining that
although the challenged bright-line rule was “artificial at its edges” when compared to a more
contextual balancing inquiry, that artificiality was “more than offset by the benefits of a clear
rule”—predictability and ease of application that, in turn, fostered investment).
31. Frederick Schauer has suggested that legal training socializes lawyers to accept rules
even when they lead to bad results in particular cases. See Frederick Schauer, Thinking
Like a Lawyer: A New Introduction to Legal Reasoning 8–10 (2009).
32. Michel Crozier, The Bureaucratic Phenomenon 54 (1964).
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And rules are important within bureaucracies for other reasons. One of
the central challenges for any bureaucracy is how to ensure that line person-
nel at the bottom implement policy decisions made at the top. Discretion-
denying rules are one way in which upper-level officials can seek to protect
the policy they make from disagreement at lower levels.33 They are also tools
agencies can use to ensure that they can fill bureaucratic slots with less than
ideally competent personnel (as will inevitably happen) without unaccept-
able levels of dysfunction.34
Yet administrative lawyers know well that agency personnel don’t merely
implement inflexible directions; they also exercise discretion. Indeed, as one
scholar put it, “[d]iscretion is at the center of most accounts of bureau-
cracy.”35 The whole enterprise of American administrative law—responding
to the fear that agencies are outside popular control—derives from the fact
that bureaucrats do not merely mindlessly apply rules, but also make policy
choices.36
Agencies exercise discretion at both policy-articulation and policy-im-
plementation stages of their process. We can see the former in the failure of
the delegation doctrine: administrators routinely make discretionary policy
choices in figuring out how to carry out legislative commands.37 Graeber, I
suppose, might answer that policymaking discretion is irrelevant to his dis-
cussion, since he is primarily concerned with interaction between line bu-
reaucrats and the general public (that is, policy implementation).38
33. Witness, in this regard, the frustration of top policymakers at the Department of
Homeland Security in getting their policies implemented by hostile line personnel in the
agency’s Immigration and Customs Enforcement and Customs and Border Protection units.
See Hiroshi Motomura, The President’s Dilemma: Executive Authority, Enforcement, and the
Rule of Law in Immigration Law, 55 Washburn L.J. 1 (2015).
34. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Creating the Administrative Constitution: The Lost
One Hundred Years of American Administrative Law 310 (2012); Elizabeth Magill, Fore-
word: Agency Self-Regulation, 77 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 859, 884–86 (2009).
35. Magill, supra note 34, at 859.
36. See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 Harv. L.
Rev. 1667, 1676–88 (1975).
37. Delegation-doctrine challenges initially reflected the view that agencies shouldn’t be
exercising discretion at all: they should simply be implementing policy choices made by the
legislature. See, e.g., Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 699–700 (1892) (Lamar, J., concurring). The
Supreme Court rejected that position. Because Congress wasn’t itself equipped to set rates for
every railroad route, for example, it had no choice but to direct bureaucrats to fix rates that
were “just and reasonable considering the service given.” J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United
States, 276 U.S. 394, 407–08 (1928). In making those choices, though, the bureaucrats faced
questions: Should rates be designed to guarantee railroads a “fair return”? Return calculated
with reference to what base? How high should that return be? Should some services cross-
subsidize others? Should railroads be required to set aside excess profits into a contingent
fund? See B.W. Patch, Railroad Rates and Federal Regulation of Transportation
(1934), http://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/document.php?id=cqresrre1934092700 [https:/
/perma.cc/68D2-54YS]. All of those questions involved discretionary policymaking.
38. In practice, though, there’s no clear distinction between global policymaking and
case-by-case policy implementation; the same substantive choices can present themselves in
either context. See, e.g., Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458 (1983) (approving the agency’s
resolution of individual cases by means of global rulemaking); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S.
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Discretion in policy implementation too, though, is baked into the na-
ture of law enforcement. Regulation in the United States incorporates infor-
mal elements.39 Regulators often see it as too costly to hammer regulated
parties into submission via brute-force compliance efforts, and so they en-
gage instead on the basis of relative bargaining power, shared values, and
personal relationships.40 That process is one of “accommodations, threats,
and tradeoffs between enforcement official and violator that result in com-
promises and modifications of the [effective] law.”41 After all, regulators’
resources are limited. Any enforcement system must rely heavily on volun-
tary compliance; litigation and insistence on formal remedies can gum up
the works. Regulators need cooperation from regulated parties to collect the
information they seek. All of these factors push in the direction of a bargain-
ing-oriented, rules-eschewing bureaucracy.42
Graeber might argue that bargaining-mediated enforcement too is irrel-
evant to his discussion. A bargaining-based approach will only lead bureau-
crats to seek accommodation with folks who actually have bargaining power;
bureaucrats might still be rigid and demanding with those who do not.
Graeber might thus characterize bargaining-based approaches to regulation
as a mere form of accommodation within the agglomerated corporate-gov-
ernment borg, rather than as a mode of bureaucratic interaction with ordi-
nary members of the (noncorporate, nongovernment) public.
But it remains the case that American law often makes policy imple-
mentation a matter of bureaucratic discretion in contexts where regulators
interact with relatively powerless individuals. That discretion is explicit in
the statute in some cases, such as the discretion of an immigration judge to
ignore an asylum recipient’s criminal background “for humanitarian pur-
poses . . . or when it is otherwise in the public interest.”43 Sometimes it is
implicit in a particular statutory scheme, such as the Department of Home-
land Security’s discretion whether to seek to deport an individual found
present in this country without authorization.44 Administrative law routinely
empowers bureaucrats to use discretion and frees them from rules.
194 (1947) (approving the agency’s proceeding case-by-case without promulgating a global
rule).
39. See Jonathan Weinberg, Broadcasting and the Administrative Process in Japan and the
United States, 39 Buff. L. Rev. 615, 623–33 (1991).
40. See id. at 625–26.
41. Weinberg, supra note 39, at 624 (alteration in original) (quoting Cento G. Veljanov-
ski, The Economics of Regulatory Enforcement, in Enforcing Regulation 171, 172 (Keith
Hawkins & John M. Thomas eds., 1984)); see also Theodore J. Lowi, The End of Liber-
alism: Ideology, Policy, and the Crisis of Public Authority 147–49 (1969).
42. For a longer discussion contrasting different models of administrative enforcement,
see Weinberg, supra note 39, at 623–33.
43. 8 U.S.C. § 1159(c) (2012); see Elizabeth Keyes, Beyond Saints and Sinners: Discretion
and the Need for New Narratives in the U.S. Immigration System, 26 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 207,
215–16 (2012).
44. See Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Beyond Deportation: The Role of
Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Cases 146–50 (2015).
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Graeber frames his argument in terms of members of the public being
limited by rules (so that one’s ability to claim a benefit, say, depends on
providing all and only that information specified on a preprinted form45);
I’ve focused here on whether bureaucrats are themselves bound by rules. It’s
important to understand, though, that the two things are the same. Line
administrators in a bureaucracy, where bound by rules, are instruments of
their superiors. They distribute forms directing members of the public to
provide certain information because that is the information that the rules of
the bureaucracy in which they toil make relevant to their decision. To the
extent the system gives line administrators discretion, on the other hand,
they can take into account such information as they choose.
The upshot is that bureaucratic agents interact with the public both in
rule-bound and in discretion-driven ways; the obtuse exercises of bureau-
cratic power that Graeber criticizes can be seen in either context. Indeed,
Graeber discusses one key setting in which bureaucratic agents wielding the
threat of violence have tremendous discretion in their interactions with the
public: policing.46 Police are bureaucrats—government line personnel apply-
ing and enforcing legal requirements—who make discretionary judgments
legally characterizing the facts before them, and back up those judgments
with violence.
Police, Graeber says, are not effectively bound by rules. It is “extraordi-
nary [sic] difficult . . . for a police officer to do anything to an American
citizen that would lead to that officer being convicted of a crime” (p. 195).
Nor is officers’ behavior, as he sees it, predictable in the ways we seek from a
bureaucrat applying rules. Their work, as he describes it, has little to do with
rules.47 And yet police officers illustrate Graeber’s larger claim that the
American bureaucrat need not understand or empathize with those subject
to his authority.48
The bottom line is this: we can have bureaucratic stupidity—and we
often do—even in the absence of rules. If there’s something special about
rules leading them to play a leading role in Graeber’s critique, we haven’t
identified it yet.
45. See, e.g., pp. 45–48.
46. See pp. 72–75, 80–81.
47. Graeber at one point seems to suggest that police authority is about rules in the
following sense: because a police officer exercises judgment to characterize a situation with a
particular “administrative rubric (an orderly or a disorderly crowd? A properly or improperly
registered vehicle?)” and may respond with violence if a member of the public challenges that
characterization, we can therefore see the “police truncheon [as] precisely the point where the
state’s bureaucratic imperative for imposing simple administrative schema and its monopoly
on coercive force come together.” P. 80. But the administrative rubrics at play there are not
mechanical, hard-edged rules like the rest of the “simple administrative schema” Graeber de-
scribes; on the contrary, his point is that their factual predicates leave the officer with the
discretion to pick his rubric of choice. An officer so described, able to pick and choose from all
the facts before him to support his characterization, lives in the world of standards rather than
that of rules.
48. See pp. 80–81.
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Next: Graeber’s take on rules and standards, it should be clear, departs
from the ordinary legal understanding. Graeber recognizes in passing some
of the advantages of rules (or, at least, some of the disadvantages of stan-
dards) when he notes that reliance on simple rules can sometimes usefully
avoid burdensome interpretive labor; it can help ensure that a decisionmaker
does not rely on factors that are better treated as extraneous (such as her
feelings about the library book I am trying to check out).49 But the conven-
tional legal understanding is that rules and standards each have their place.
In some cases, the advantages of rules will carry the day; in others, the bene-
fits of standards will win out.
For Graeber, by contrast, rules rarely have a place. He takes for granted
that in any desirable system, decisionmakers should almost always look at
thick factual context; decision by rule should be limited to exceptional situa-
tions.50 How come, though? What’s behind that view?
Forty years ago, some thinkers suggested that standards, rather than
rules, were better attuned to left-wing political thinking. Legal doctrines,
Duncan Kennedy argued, tend to reflect two antagonistic worldviews.51 The
first sees individuals (absent government intervention) as largely indepen-
dent and autonomous, free to make their own choices; under this view, the
role of law is to preserve order while minimizing restraints on each individ-
ual’s freedom of action to pursue his own ends. The latter sees everyday
interaction between private actors as ubiquitously characterized by (varying
degrees of) unequal bargaining power and constraint; with our lives and
circumstances importantly socially determined, law supports our looking
out for one another as a community.52
Critical Legal Studies scholars suggested a link between the first
worldview and rules, and between the second and standards.53 Take contract
law as an example: If we assume that private ordering in the marketplace is
routinely free and autonomous, we might follow a rule-like approach en-
forcing all contracts supported by formal consideration, subject to bright-
line rule-like exceptions for fraud, duress, and lack of capacity. But if
“fraud” or “duress” is present to greater or lesser degree in every case, it
makes less sense to have sharply bounded exceptions; it would make more
sense to invalidate contracts, after taking all facts of the situation into ac-
count, if one party seems to have had undue bargaining power, or if the
49. See supra text following note 11; see also p. 152.
50. See, e.g., p. 75.
51. See Kennedy, supra note 21, at 1766–74 (discussing the “fundamental premises” of
individualism and altruism).
52. See id.; see also Weinberg, supra note 24, at 1167–74.
53. See Kennedy, supra note 21, at 1737–66; see also Mark Kelman, A Guide to Criti-
cal Legal Studies 54–63 (1987).
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contracts simply seem too unfair.54 That inquiry is fact-specific—standard-
like—requiring sensitivity and imaginative identification.55
Graeber is a man of the Left and an anarchist; Kennedy’s thesis thus
provides one perspective on Graeber’s critique of rules. But there’s a deeper
answer than that. To get there, I’ll need to take a moment to discuss Grae-
ber’s understanding of power.
III. On Power
It’s not wholly clear from the book whether Graeber opposes the use of
collectively sanctioned force in any situation. If a former lover appears in
your bedroom uninvited and refuses to leave, is it appropriate from Grae-
ber’s perspective for you to have the option of calling police to have him
removed? What if a former lover appears in your bedroom and threatens to
kill you? While some passages in Graeber’s book suggest that society can
never bring force to bear,56 his larger discussion suggests a more nuanced
answer.57
That answer emerges from a story he tells of his observations of rural
Madagascar, part of his early anthropological fieldwork. The government
54. See Kelman, supra note 53, at 18–25.
55. See id. at 60. This account is oversimplified and the premise controversial, as dis-
cussed in Weinberg, supra note 24, at 1167–81, but it’s suggestive for our purposes.
56. Graeber urges at one point that, at least when it comes to noncriminal disputes,
police are simply unnecessary: “[F]or the overwhelming majority of humans who have lived in
human history, there has simply been nothing remotely like police to call . . . . Yet they worked
something out.” P. 32 n.31. That approach has only limited utility. When one private actor is
much more powerful than another (say, because he is better positioned to resort to violence to
get his way) and lacks a commitment to peaceful cooperation, then parties “work[ ] something
out” in the shadow of that imbalance. P. 32 n.31. At various points in human history, when,
say, men have asserted their power to rape and subordinate women or whites have asserted
power to enslave blacks, we have “worked something out” by allowing the strong to dominate
the weak. Dispensing with government threats of force, thus, seems to work only if we have
also somehow eliminated concentrations of private power.
57. Graeber emphasizes at one point that most police activity relates to what he describes
as “rules and regulations” rather than “criminal matters.” Pp. 72–73. His discussion is consis-
tent with the notion that state-sponsored force is acceptable but only for true “criminal mat-
ters,” based on something like the malum prohibitum versus malum in se distinction. See
Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S. 197, 210 (1893) (Brewer, J., dissenting) (contrasting ma-
lum in se, “an undertaking unlawful in and of itself,” with malum prohibitum, “one simply
forbidden by statute”). That line, though, is surprisingly hard to draw. Immigration law, for
example, sometimes makes deportability turn on a similar inquiry: whether the criminal stat-
ute a noncitizen has violated involves conduct involving “moral turpitude.” See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) (2012); see also id. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i). Yet “[n]o one can really say what is
meant by saying a crime involv[es] moral turpitude.” Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223,
233–34 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (quoting Restriction of Immigration: Hearing on H.R.
10384 Before the H. Comm. on Immigration & Naturalization, 64th Cong. 8 (1916) (statement
of Rep. Adolph Sabath)). Courts have found the phrase—and the case law—incoherent. See,
e.g., Arias v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 823, 830–36 (7th Cir. 2016) (Posner, J., concurring in the judg-
ment); Nunez v. Holder, 594 F.3d 1124, 1130–31 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Mary
Holper, Deportation for a Sin: Why Moral Turpitude Is Void for Vagueness, 90 Neb. L. Rev. 647
(2012).
April 2017] Bureaucracy as Violence 1111
bureaucracy in Madagascar was mainly interested in tax collection and oper-
ated through the threat of force (pp. 60–64). But that government was dis-
tant, largely absent, and “played almost no role in regulating the minutiae of
daily life” (p. 61). At least as an effective matter, “there were no building
codes, no open container laws, no mandatory licensing and insurance of
vehicles, no rules about who could buy or sell or smoke or build or eat or
drink what where, where people could play music or tend their animals” (p.
61). So did the community not see itself as bound by any law? Hardly. It had
a legal system, but not a bureaucratic one—rather, it was “regulated by cus-
tom, deliberation by communal assemblies, or magical taboo” (p. 61). And
unlike bureaucratic systems premised on the threat of force and wielding the
language of peremptory command, Graeber suggests, that older Malagasy
social structure was one characterized by “explanations, deliberation, and,
ultimately, consent” (pp. 64–65); its social relations involved “debate, clarifi-
cation, and renegotiation” (p. 66).
This story suggests that the ultimate problem, for Graeber, is neither
rules nor power as such. Rather, the problem is power that is wielded imper-
sonally—power that is not the product of discourse. I’ll take a moment to
briefly define a term: Ju¨rgen Habermas usefully adopted the word “dis-
course”58 to describe a mode of speech in which every individual can “take
part, freely and equally, in a cooperative search for truth, where nothing
coerces anyone except the force of the better argument.”59 The communica-
tive exchange takes place without restriction and on an even playing field.
Each person aims to persuade in good faith rather than seeking to threaten,
trick, or bribe; each participant takes account of the others’ interests and
needs, and modifies her own accordingly.60
Central to Habermas’s philosophy is the idea that society can legiti-
mately formulate moral norms only through discourse.61 Graeber, similarly,
58. Well, strictly speaking, he adopted the word “diskurs,” but “discourse” is the stan-
dard English translation.
59. Jonathan Weinberg, The Right to Be Taken Seriously, 67 U. Miami L. Rev. 149, 170
(2012) (quoting Ju¨rgen Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action
198 (Christian Lenhardt & Shierry Weber Nicholson trans., 1990)).
60. See Ju¨rgen Habermas, Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse
Ethics 49–50 (Ciaran Cronin trans., 1993); Weinberg, supra note 59, at 169–73, 176.
61. See Ju¨rgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Dis-
course Theory of Law and Democracy 107 (William Rehg trans., 1996) (articulating the
discourse principle); Weinberg, supra note 59, at 170. That’s challenging because “the repres-
sive and exclusionary effects of unequally distributed social power, structural violence, and
systematically distorted communication” make discourse supremely difficult to achieve in the
real world. Kenneth Baynes, A Critical Theory Perspective on Civil Society and the State, in
Civil Society and Government 123, 138 (Nancy L. Rosenblum & Robert C. Post eds., 2002)
(quoting Habermas, supra at 307–08). For what the author concludes is a real-world example
of Habermasian discourse, see A. Michael Froomkin, Habermas@discourse.net: Toward a Criti-
cal Theory of Cyberspace, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 749 (2003) (analyzing the IETF Internet standards
process).
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appears to see power within the Malagasy social structure as legitimate pre-
cisely because he sees it as discursive.62 It seems implausible, from this
reader’s perspective, that there was no exercise of power involved in Mala-
gasy regulation “by custom, deliberation by communal assemblies, or magi-
cal taboo” (p. 61). But that exercise of power is acceptable for Graeber
because, we are told, traditional Malagasy relationships relied on “delibera-
tion, explanation, and consensus decision-making” rather than on “the lan-
guage of command.”63 From that perspective, the problem with bureaucracy
is that even if bureaucratic commands manage not to be arbitrary, it re-
mains the case that they derive their force from the threat of violence rather
than from discursive engagement and persuasion.
This explains, then, Graeber’s condemnation of rules. Discourse, by def-
inition, is unrestricted; no facts are off the table. The language of discourse is
standards. Rules by their nature preclude discourse; their point is to avoid
discussion. Rules allow quick, predictable, and inexpensive application, but
they do so by short-circuiting the deliberation, clarification, renegotiation,
and thus consent that Graeber sees as essential. I noted earlier that Graeber
doesn’t much worry about the costs of proceeding via standards. Those
costs, though, are precisely the costs of discourse generally. Law likes rules
because law rejects the idea that we can or should try to run the world
through discourse.
There remains the question whether purely (or predominantly) dis-
course-based government, of the sort Graeber would approve, is even possi-
ble. One might start with the example of traditional Madagascar: How
discursive can a system be when its law is based in custom and magical
62. Cf. p. 61 (distinguishing between “bureaucracy” and “deliberation”). Others have
drawn the connection between Habermas’s and Graeber’s work. See, e.g., Adam Fish, The
Public Sphere of Occupy Wall Street, Savage Minds (Oct. 30, 2011), http://savageminds.org/
2011/10/30/the-public-sphere-of-occupy-wall-street/ [https://perma.cc/K6Z9-29BF]. The
reader should bear in mind, though, that Graeber doesn’t reference Habermas, and—as an
anarchist—rejects a variety of Habermas’s underlying premises. See Nancy Fraser, Against An-
archism, Pub. Seminar (Oct. 9, 2013), http://www.publicseminar.org/2013/10/against-anarch-
ism/ [https://perma.cc/L7RQ-JBYQ]. In particular, while Habermas and Graeber agree that
commercial and state bureaucracy operate through the instrumental application of power
rather than through communicative discourse, Habermas does not see that fact as rendering
bureaucracy illegitimate. See James Gordon Finlayson, Habermas: A Very Short Intro-
duction 53–56 (2005); Weinberg, supra note 59, at 176.
63. P. 64. Graeber’s argument tends toward the unsubtle, away from shades of gray.
Bureaucratic commands, we are told, ultimately rest on the threat of force, and thus are no
more than systems of structural violence. Pp. 58–60. They are a world away from traditional
Madagascar, which relied on “debate, clarification, and renegotiation.” P. 66. And yet, so long
as there are costs to relying on violence and compulsion in every instance, bureaucratic sys-
tems too will feature debate, clarification, and renegotiation. As I’ve noted, administrative
agencies in the U.S. routinely rely on non-brute-force tools such as education, personal rela-
tionships, and appeals to shared values. See supra text accompanying notes 40–42. Even an
imagined society whose values include a firm commitment to community-wide discussion and
discourse will see instances where discourse is inadequate. In short, discourse, and structural
violence, exist on a continuum. Graeber would likely respond, though, that my search for
nuance only helps obscure the ruined lives and structural violence on which our current sys-
tem rests.
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taboo? Custom and taboo are facts, not judgments, and as such are relatively
impervious to discussion. It may be that in such a society people would be
less likely to imagine the possibility of challenging prevailing norms, but
that’s not a hallmark of democratic openness.
Graeber suggests at one point that premodern societies in general were
able to avoid the structural violence he condemns. Most ancient or medieval
governments, we are told, would never have thought to claim a territorial
monopoly on the legitimate use of force—“this was the logic of conquering
empires, not of any sort of civilized community” (pp. 175–76). It’s challeng-
ing to generalize about ancient and medieval governments, and the nature of
political relationships in the medieval period was sufficiently different from
today’s that even the word “government” can be misleading. It seems clear,
though, that some holders of medieval political power did enforce legal obli-
gations via the threat of force and did not see that as inconsistent with “civi-
lized community.”64
We should understand, moreover, that it’s not enough that government
shift away from command to bargaining and renegotiation. Bargaining with-
out more doesn’t constitute discourse; it is a form of instrumental behavior
disconnected from “the force of the better argument.”65 Administrative tech-
niques in Japan, for example, are famously reliant on bargaining rather than
on the voice of command.66 But bargaining and consultation in Japan, as in
the United States, take place in the shadow of implied regulatory threat, and
regulators choose the parties with whom they consult based on considera-
tions of social, political, and economic power.67 That’s a model for re-
warding the already influential; it’s not a model for discourse.68
Rather, the sort of discourse Graeber seems to seek can only take place
when the formulation and administration of the law goes beyond mere ne-
gotiation and instead is part of a cooperative enterprise marked by empathy
and open-heartedness. Can we do that? In this book at least, Graeber is
unhelpful: he writes only that the arrival of his preferred world—one with-
out states, capitalism, or bureaucracy, operating through nonhierarchical
democratic collectives—will require a “complex and multifaceted revolu-
tionary process whose outlines could hardly, at this point, be fully antici-
pated” (p. 97). That admission leaves a fairly large Kumbaya-shaped hole in
the book. To be sure, Occupy encampments of the self-selected and like-
64. See, e.g., Alice Taylor, Lex Scripta and the Problem of Enforcement: Anglo-Saxon,
Welsh, and Scottish Law Compared, in Legalism: Community and Justice 47, 54–60 (Fer-
nanda Pirie & Judith Scheele eds., 2014).
65. See Habermas, supra note 61, at 285; Baynes, supra note 61, at 126; Weinberg, supra
note 59, at 170 (quoting Ju¨rgen Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative
Action 198 (Christian Lenhardt & Shierry Weber Nicholson trans., 1990)).
66. See Frank K. Upham, Law and Social Change in Postwar Japan 21–27 (1987);
Weinberg, supra note 39, at 634–40.
67. See Weinberg, supra note 39, at 627, 634–36, 730–31.
68. See id. at 729.
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minded were able to make good use of nonhierarchial consensus tech-
niques.69 But that doesn’t tell us whether it would be desirable for society at
large to abandon hierarchical organization, or whether that could be made
to happen.
IV. On Empathy
For all that, as I stated at the start of this Review, Graeber’s book makes
a crucial point. We can all agree that law should encourage legislators and
administrators to attend to the views and desires of members of the public.
How is it to do that, though? Electoral democracy takes us only part of the
way.70 From time to time, American law has taken steps attempting to
achieve that goal through discursive means. Those steps have been small,
falling far short of anything Graeber (or Habermas) would consider mean-
ingful, but they teach us something important nonetheless.
Let’s start by going back a few hundred years to the early right to peti-
tion, which was said to be in “the very nature” of republican government.71
The right to petition was understood in colonial times and in the early
American republic to carry with it an affirmative right that government
hear, fairly consider, and respond to the issues each petition raised.72 It thus
reflected a need deeply encoded in American DNA for government to listen
to its citizens, to take them seriously and treat them with respect.73 As late as
1836, that obligation was described in terms explicitly evoking discourse and
dialogue: Congress’s refusal to consider petitions on the merits and respond,
it was said, would mean that “the people of the United States [were] not to
be reasoned with.”74 For government to speak purely in the instrumental
language of command, we believed, would deprive it of legitimacy; demo-
cratic citizens are owed persuasion and not mere pronouncement.75
The petition right lost its original meaning well over a century ago,
though. It withered as part of this nation’s shift from a preliberal political
world of organic reciprocal obligation to a new politics of voting and rights-
holding.76 In more modern times, when legislatures decided that they did
69. See Fish, supra note 62.
70. See Jonathan Weinberg, On Commercial—and Corporate—Speech, 99 Marq. L. Rev.
559, 599–601 (2016); Weinberg, supra note 59, at 165–66.
71. Weinberg, supra note 59, at 191 (quoting 3 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the
Constitution of the United States § 1887 (1833)).
72. See id. at 191–98.
73. Id. at 208–09.
74. Weinberg, supra note 59, at 205 (quoting 12 Reg. Deb. 2331 (1836) (statement of
Rep. Caleb Cushing)).
75. Stephen Macedo, Liberal Virtues: Citizenship, Virtue, and Community in
Liberal Constitutionalism 41 (1990); Weinberg, supra note 59, at 175.
76. Weinberg, supra note 59, at 205–08.
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not want to engage with petitions on the merits, there was no way to force
them to do so.77
Similarly, consider modern American administrative law, which requires
government decisionmakers in a variety of contexts—most importantly, no-
tice-and-comment rulemaking78—not only to seek input from the public on
their proposed actions, but to take that input seriously, consider it on the
merits, and respond.79 That too can be seen as part of a commitment to
discourse.80
But that doesn’t really work either. Agencies tend to make their key
regulatory choices outside of the notice-and-comment environment, at
times when industry has unfettered access.81 The vast majority of comments
are filed by industry members, and agencies are more responsive to those
than they are to comments filed by individuals.82 Even in cases when indi-
viduals file large numbers of comments, agency members tend not to give
them careful attention.83 Judicial review only enforces engagement with a
subset of legally sophisticated comments that are filed by parties with the
resources and motivation to go to court.84 More importantly, judicial review
cannot require an agency to consider a commenter’s arguments with an
open heart and mind; at best it can require the agency to assign a staffer to
recite some plausible reason for rejecting the commentator’s position.85
Conclusion
The lesson? Law isn’t a successful tool for promoting meaningful dia-
logic engagement between legislators and bureaucrats on the one hand and
members of the public on the other. We want bureaucrats to openheartedly
understand, and discursively respond to, members of the public. But law
can’t mandate empathy. That means that legal mechanisms for ensuring that
bureaucrats take public perspectives to heart can’t fully work.
Put another way, Graeber is right: bureaucracy is stupid. Imaginative
identification is difficult. Understanding people whose situations are differ-
ent from our own is difficult. For police to understand the communities
they patrol is difficult. All this is all the more true when meaningful under-
standing means that a regulator—or a police officer—must look out
through the eyes of someone whose race, or gender, or gender identification,
77. Id. at 210. As currently understood, the petition right entitles us only to transmit our
views to government; the government is not legally obliged to pay attention to what we say. See
Smith v. Ark. State Highway Emps., Local 1315, 441 U.S. 463, 465 (1979) (per curiam).
78. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012).
79. Failure by agencies to do so will lead to reversal on judicial review. See Weinberg,
supra note 59, at 153–58.
80. See id. at 176–78.
81. See id. at 180–81.
82. Id. at 183–84.
83. See id. at 185–86.
84. See id.
85. Id. at 210.
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or religion, is different from his own. Overcoming those difficulties takes
tremendous effort. Law can’t cause people to undertake that effort.
Graeber suggests no way out of this trap other than sweeping away states
and capitalism to achieve a “genuinely non-bureaucratized social order” (pp.
100–01). For most of us, that answer will not satisfy. The problem Graeber
identifies, though, is real and deadly serious. Since law can’t solve it, we need
to think harder about mechanisms outside the law that might.
